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ADR AND THE COURTS: RENEWING OUR 
COMMITMENT TO INNOVATION 
DR. JULIE MACFARLANE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As the papers from this Symposium demonstrate, considerable 
progress has been made over the past decade toward the goal of a 
“multi-door courthouse”1 that reflects an expanding legal pluralism.  
The traditional assumption of “one size fits all”—where that size was 
adjudication by third parties in a public space—has withered in the face 
of the growing diversity of conflict resolution practice, both private and 
public.  Many courthouses now offer mediation programs, neutral 
evaluation and assessment services, counseling, duty counsel services, 
case management, and judicial settlement conferencing programs.  The 
importance of attempting to resolve disputes short of a full trial is fully 
accepted among policymakers, for whom it makes obvious economic 
sense, and is increasingly accepted by members of the bench and bar, 
who must continue to protect the rights and interests of disputing 
parties.  This plethora of processes—with new programs being added all 
the time—often feels messy and confusing.  We sometimes crave the 
certainty and simplicity of the days before the expansion of ADR in the 
courts where there was just one process: litigation.  Practically speaking, 
it is also easier to marshal support behind one or two demonstrably 
effective core programs than to keep testing and evaluating new pilot 
schemes.  However, I shall argue here that we have no choice but to 
keep innovating if we are to meet the new challenges of change, despite 
how untidy and unsettled that sometimes feels. 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Windsor; Professor of the Practice, Kroc Institute for 
International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. 
1. A term attributed to Professor Frank Sander, at the Pound Conference (the National 
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice).  See 
Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79, 113 (1976) (“What are the 
significant characteristics of various alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (such as 
adjudication by courts, arbitration, mediation, negotiation, and various blends of these and 
other devises)?”).  The term “multi-door courthouse” came to be associated with Professor 
Sander’s ideas.  See Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argument 
that the Term “ADR” Has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 97, 97 n.4. 
14 - MACFARLANE-10.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/8/2012  10:07 PM 
928 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:927 
 
II.  DISPUTE RESOLUTION IS AN ART, NOT A SCIENCE 
This expansion in programming has led to an increased urgency 
about “fitting the forum to the fuss”2—matching processes to disputes—
and has raised expectations about the efficacy of alternative dispute 
resolution.  Surely the range of available procedures allows us to 
maximize the chances of settlement by selecting the “right” process for a 
particular dispute.  Doesn’t our deepening experience with settlement 
procedures enable us to triage files as they come into the court registry 
and direct them to the “right” program?3  If almost all cases settle, can 
we use case management tracking to identify the characteristics of the 
exceptions early on and fast-track everything else?  From a growing 
volume of significant evaluation studies, can we distinguish cases based 
on particular variables such as area of conflict, party type or numbers, or 
amounts at stake, and direct them to the most efficacious processes? 
These are tempting thoughts, and we shall continue to debate their 
possibilities.  For now, however, we must accept their limits.  Conflict 
resolution is an art and not a science.  Disappointingly, evaluation 
studies fail to consistently identify particular case characteristics that 
make those disputes more or less susceptible to resolution via ADR.4  
Instead, we are reminded of what those of us who practice conflict 
resolution are forced to confront each time we convene parties for 
negotiation—that every conflict is unique and can rarely be understood 
via a checklist of variables, and that our predictive powers are seriously 
limited.  In fact, one of the most significant variables in settlement is the 
amount of time spent on a case.5  Another crucial factor is the 
experience of the third party.6  These factors are not necessarily under 
 
2. Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-
Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49, 66 (1994). 
3. See Peter Salem, Debra Kulak & Robin M. Deutsch, Triaging Family Court Services: 
The Connecticut Judicial Branch’s Family Civil Intake Screen, 27 PACE L. REV. 741, 743, 755–
56 (2007) (discussing the use of triage as an existing “intake and screening practice”). 
4. See Roselle L. Wissler, The Effectiveness of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in 
Civil Cases, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 55, 80–82 (2004). 
5. This is the conclusion of many studies; see, for example, the comprehensive meta-
analysis of evaluations of family programs in Joan Hunt & Ceridwen Roberts, Intervening in 
Litigated Contact: Ideas from Other Jurisdictions, FAM. POL’Y BRIEFING (Univ. of Oxford: 
Dep’t of Soc. Policy & Soc. Work, Oxford, Eng.), Sept. 2008, at 1, 4 (noting a correlation 
between mediation attendance and higher settlement rates). 
6. Craig A. McEwen & Roselle L. Wissler, Finding Out If It Is True: Comparing 
Negotiation and Mediation Through Research, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 131, 140–41 (2002). 
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our control in our courthouses, where we must live with the 
programming and the personnel we have, even while lobbying for more 
and better of each. 
The uncertainty that characterizes our ability to fit disputes to 
processes produces a variety of responses.  One is a new assertion of 
“one size fits all,” with extravagant claims made for a particular new 
procedure.  This is exemplified in the zealous promotion of particular 
approaches—for example, the now-notorious collaborative law versus 
cooperative law debate7 or the debate over facilitative versus evaluative 
mediation.8  These discussions may be stimulating on an intellectual 
level, but they are often polarizing among practitioners and create 
inflated expectations among clients.  When the zealous advocates of 
particular approaches or processes really get going, they veer 
dangerously close to suggesting that one single, preferred process works 
“best” for all or even most disputes.  This was the flawed thinking that 
got us into this current mess in the first place. 
The reality of practical conflict resolution requires responsiveness to 
the unique nature of each and every conflict.  We continue to learn—
about process design, about disputing, about conflict dynamics, about 
effective advocacy, and about intervention.  This means we must reject 
any assumption of orthodoxy—for example, always do facilitative 
mediation, always do evaluation mediation, always use lawyer-
mediators, never use lawyer-mediators—or simple formulations for 
triage.  For all these reasons, it is critical that we continue to experiment 
and to innovate in conflict resolution programming and, as we do so, 
keep assessing and evaluating. 
III.  A LANDSCAPE OF CONSTANT CHANGE 
A brief review of the pace of change in disputing both inside and 
outside the formal court structure reveals a state of flux.  ADR in the 
courts is constantly evolving and developing—sometimes moving 
forward with new programs, sometimes seeing programs defunded, but 
always changing.  Moreover, each court services manager brings a 
nuanced approach to programming in his courthouse, while each state 
 
7. For a perspective on this debate, see John Lande, Practical Insights from an Empirical 
Study of Cooperative Lawyers in Wisconsin, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 203, 247–66. 
8. Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, “Evaluative” Mediation Is an Oxymoron, 14 
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31, 31–32 (1996). 
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policymaker sees different problems and potential in his court system.  
Ten years ago, judicial settlement and mediation programs were almost 
unheard of, but now they are features in many courthouses.9  Parenting-
coordination programming and innovation maintenance enforcement 
programs proliferate.10  As the volume of self-represented litigants 
(SRLs) in the family and civil courts rises11 and demands increase for a 
more simplified and streamlined civil procedure, we shall see yet more 
changes. 
Changes in court procedures are a reflection of broader change in 
the disputing landscape.  The World Wide Web has empowered 
consumers like never before through their access to information that 
was previously only available to them via professionals.  The 
relationship between technical expertise and professional service has 
changed beyond recognition by the development of the Internet.  Where 
lawyers and courts have for generations assumed respect and deference, 
clients can now seek out a range of opinions beyond traditional legal 
sources.  This means that client expectations about “value-for-money” 
in professional services, including but not limited to law, are also 
changing.  When a problem can be Googled and some sort of “expert” 
information can be obtained with a few clicks of a mouse, professional 
advisors need to be able to offer more than “just” technical information 
to represent value-for-money.  Some of the tangible results of this shift 
are the movement toward web-based self-help legal services; the 
increasing role of paralegal services in some areas; new consumer 
interest in “unbundling legal services” where they purchase a particular 
service from a lawyer rather than retain the lawyer for the duration of a 
case;12 and a developing market for all types of vaunted “cost-effective” 
dispute resolution processes, including collaborative law and mediation. 
 
9. See generally Roselle L. Wissler, Judicial Settlement Conferences and Staff Mediation: 
Empirical Research Findings, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2011, at 18, 18–20 (describing the 
now-common use of judicial settlement and mediation programs). 
10. Blaisure and Geasler found that the number of U.S. programs increased nearly six 
times between 1990 and 1994.  Karen R. Blaisure & Margie J. Geasler, Results of a Survey of 
Court-Connected Parent Education Programs in U.S. Counties, 34 FAM. & CONCILIATION 
CTS. REV. 23, 32–33 (1996). 
11. See infra Part V.B. 
12. See Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling of Legal Services and the Family Lawyer, 28 FAM. 
L.Q. 421, 422–24 (1994) (defining unbundling legal services as the ability of the client to take 
“charge of selecting from lawyers’ services [that are] only a portion of the full package and 
contracting with the lawyer accordingly”). 
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Because the disputing culture, court and policy initiatives, and the 
practice of law keep changing, we have to keep changing too.  This is not 
a time for the entrenchment of fixed beliefs or academic arguments over 
who is a “real” mediator (or conflict resolution practitioner) problem-
solver.  Instead, we have to welcome well-thought-out innovations with 
an open mind. 
IV.  CONVERGENCE: A SYMPTOM OF CHANGE 
One example of the constantly evolving nature of dispute processing 
is the development of hybrid models of dispute resolution in legal 
practice, judicial processes, and courthouse culture.  In each of these 
areas, there is evidence of what I have described elsewhere as 
“convergence,”13 where two different structural and cultural systems 
have moved closer together to produce a new form that borrows 
characteristics of each.  The result is akin to a chemical reaction, where 
two different agents combine to produce a new compound. 
Changes in the core skills of legal practice suggest a convergence 
between traditional skills and practices and those skills demanded by the 
new environment of settlement processes.  When lawyers attend 
mediation, settlement conferences, and in their dealings with opposing 
counsel (evidence shows that it is increasingly normative for this to 
occur earlier in the life of a file than hitherto),14 they are practicing what 
I have described as “conflict resolution advocacy.”15  Sometimes 
somewhat primitive, unschooled, and simply intuitive conflict resolution 
advocacy recognizes that advocacy in a settlement process requires a 
different set of skills than “conviction” advocacy—i.e., advocacy to 
convince a decision-maker.16  Conflict resolution advocacy is an example 
of a hybrid form.  It is built on traditional advocacy tools, including the 
 
13. See JULIE MACFARLANE, THE NEW LAWYER: HOW SETTLEMENT IS 
TRANSFORMING THE PRACTICE OF LAW 20 (2008). 
14. Earlier opening of negotiation was first institutionalized in some states and provinces 
with early mandatory mediation, but there is evidence that it has become part of the legal 
culture in some of these centers.  See Julie Macfarlane, Culture Change? A Tale of Two Cities 
and Mandatory Court-Connected Mediation, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 241, 247.  In a 2009 private 
study on file with the author, 45% of files that used negotiation first opened discussions either 
after the receiving of a statement of claim or after pleadings were closed.  Interviews with 
counsel suggested a significant shift in the time at which they were willing to open 
negotiations. 
15. See MACFARLANE, supra note 13, at 117–20. 
16. Id. at 49. 
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use of fact- and law-based argumentation, thorough research, and 
rational logic.  But effective conflict resolution advocacy also requires a 
consciousness of the other side and its emotional reaction to any 
settlement proposal, the need to develop a bargaining relationship, and 
a need for clear and effective communication (it is important for the 
other side to want to listen to you because they can simply, if they 
choose, get up and walk away).17   
Another example of the emergence of a hybrid skill relates to the 
fact that lawyers are sometimes obliged to bring their clients to and 
enable them to participate in a settlement discussion with a judge or a 
mediator.  In some instances, client participation may be minimal: 
lawyers still like to talk about “gagging” the client and doing the talking 
themselves.18  Nevertheless, the presence of clients changes everything.  
Repeat clients become more proactive in asserting their role in the 
proceedings.  Lawyers are being forced to accommodate a new type of 
client partnership that requires them to know more, and different, things 
about their clients before they walk them into bargaining sessions.  For 
example, lawyers should know their clients’ emotional priorities, their 
psychological barriers to settlement, and perhaps any potential non-
legal remedies to their problem.  The evolving practice is a convergence 
between the traditionally dominant role of the lawyer, who has 
historically conducted negotiation at arm’s length from the client, and a 
client-only process that dispenses with lawyers altogether.19  We are 
watching lawyers and their clients struggling to find the balance in 
power, airtime, and decision-making in settlement processes. 
Another hybrid is emerging in judicial practice through judicial 
settlement processes, variously framed as judicial mediation, settlement 
conferencing, and case management.20  Each of these and other similar 
procedures requires judges to rebrand themselves as the facilitators of 
settlements rather than as the adjudicators.  This may occur by creating 
momentum within a closely managed process, exploring possible deals 
in judicial mediation, or simply by speaking frankly to counsel in the 
presence of their clients.  In taking on this process management role, 
 
17. See id. at 111–16. 
18. See id. at 144–50. 
19. See id. at 129–30 (describing the “traditional model,” in which “clients are expected 
to defer to their lawyer’s expertise,” and contrasting it with changes that are occurring in the 
twenty-first century as a result of greater access to legal resources for litigants). 
20. See id. at 232–36. 
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judges are altering both their relationship to the dispute—which they 
previously only understood from the perspective of decision-maker—
and the core skills they use.21  However, they continue to draw on their 
traditional authority in all their interventions.  The bench is crafting the 
role of the “new judge” possibly faster than lawyers are creating the 
“new lawyer.” 
Finally, we are seeing examples of hybrid processes and procedures 
in courthouse culture as a result of the convergence of traditional 
adjudication and alternative dispute resolution processes.22  One 
example is the expanding role of non-lawyer professionals in courthouse 
programs, such as social workers, mediators, and child-welfare 
specialists working alongside lawyers and judges.  Another symptom of 
change is the growing volume of SRLs, whose needs are beginning to 
drive calls for the simplification of court forms and procedures.  The 
courthouse itself is now a microcosm of the change and the convergence 
between the old and new in litigation practice in particular and disputing 
in general.  In this environment, and in relation to legal and judicial 
practice, we must keep innovating and remain open to new thinking and 
ideas. 
V.  STAYING COMMITTED TO INNOVATION: TWO CASE STUDIES 
My two most recent research projects provide two informative and 
different illustrations of my argument about the need to keep 
innovating. 
A.  Islamic Marriage and Divorce 
North American Muslims, both religious and secular, widely practice 
traditional Islamic procedures for marriage and divorce.23  These 
procedures are informal private-ordering processes without the force of 
 
21. See id. at 235 (asserting that various new judicial initiatives are “changing the 
relationship between the judiciary and disputing systems and, consequently, the way that 
judges imagine their role and the skills they require”). 
22. See id. at 7 (“All courts function differently than they did twenty years ago, with at 
least some shift toward the judicial management of cases and their settlement.”). 
23. See JULIE MACFARLANE, INST. FOR SOC. POLICY & UNDERSTANDING, 
UNDERSTANDING TRENDS IN AMERICAN MUSLIM DIVORCE AND MARRIAGE: A 
DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES 6 (2012), available at 
http://www.ispu.org/GetReports/35/2399/Publications.aspx (noting that “the most 
commonplace expression of [North American Muslims’] shariʿa obligations is through critical 
rites of passage and family transitions, especially marriage and divorce”). 
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law, but they represent an important cultural ritual for many Muslims 
across social and educational demographics and inside all Muslim 
communities irrespective their country of origin.  Public speculation 
over “shariʿa law”24 has created fear about these processes, and their 
real meaning is often obscured by media distortion and by 
overwhelming suspicion of Muslims.  Muslim marriage (using an Islamic 
marriage contract or nikah)25 and divorce approved by an imam are 
examples of traditional rituals—in the language of dispute theory, 
private-ordering processes26—that are important to many Muslim 
families in North America in the same way that any community tends to 
turn to its customs in times of transition and crisis.  Muslim marriage 
and divorce are not used as substitutes for civil marriage and divorce, 
but rather as additional personal and family steps aimed at satisfying the 
wider community that the spouses have fulfilled their Islamic 
obligations, as these are understood in different Muslim cultures.27 
As an example of cultural and religious norms that play out in the 
shadow of the legal system, the case of Islamic marriage and divorce 
offers a challenge for the courts.  The justice system must decide how to 
respond to these traditions.  My research showed that North American 
Muslims do not expect the courts to apply or enforce Islamic family 
law—regarding this as a private area for their personal conscience—but 
that they want the courts to have some knowledge of their culture and 
the fundamentals of Islamic family law when they rule on conflicts over 
marriage and divorce between Muslim men and women.28  For example, 
what should the court do when faced with a dispute over the 
 
24. Shariʿa is the interpretation of the Qurʾan (and other sources), which gives rise to 
guidelines for good Muslim living.  Shariʿa (which is diverse in its understanding among 
Muslims) covers formal religious observance, but also many other aspects of family and 
everyday life.  Id.  Islamic law, or fiqh, is a sub-set of shariʿa, and includes only those parts of 
shariʿa feasible to raise to the level of a “rule.”  The vast majority of Islamic law in the 
modern world is concerned with family law—marriage, divorce, and inheritance.  On the 
distinction between shariʿa and fiqh, see WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION 
OF ISLAMIC LAW (2004). 
25. See MACFARLANE, supra note 23, at 11. 
26. See Julie Macfarlane, Working Towards Restorative Justice in Ethiopia: Integrating 
Traditional Conflict Resolution Systems with the Formal Legal System, 8 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 487, 490–91 (2007). 
27. See MACFARLANE, supra note 23, at 6.  See generally JULIE MACFARLANE, ISLAMIC 
DIVORCE IN NORTH AMERICA: A SHARIʿA PATH IN A SECULAR SOCIETY (2012) 
[hereinafter MACFARLANE, ISLAMIC DIVORCE]. 
28. See MACFARLANE, supra note 23, at 13–26. 
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enforcement of a required term in a Muslim marriage contract, such as 
the payment of the mahr,29 a promise by the husband to give his wife 
something of value (anything from a love poem to a large lump-sum 
payment) in the event of his death or if they divorce? 
In adjudicating such conflicts, judges have a variety of possible 
alternatives.  The least innovative—and the most pervasive, at least in 
the United States and to a lesser extent in Canada—is for the courts to 
simply ignore the existence of these extrajudicial processes and the 
agreements that they lead to.30  Or should the courts be prepared to 
respond to such agreements with sensitivity and respect, taking into 
account the expectations they create?  Should the courts enforce a 
promise in a marriage contract to pay a mahr upon divorce, when the 
form of the contract appears to conform to the Statute of Frauds?  Or 
should the nikah be treated as a non-justiciable “religious contract,” 
allowing the husband to escape his obligation from a very public 
promise signed in front of hundreds of wedding guests?  Should spousal 
support simply be substituted?  What if this is less than what was 
promised in the mahr?  What if the woman is committed to receiving 
her mahr, but uncomfortable with the idea of spousal support, which 
does not exist in Islam beyond the period of iddat,31 usually three 
months post-divorce?32 
The practice of religious and cultural traditions raises many 
challenges for a secular legal system.  Easy answers—assuming that 
anything with a whiff of religion is non-justiciable—are increasingly 
inadequate.  Many North American Muslims are using these traditional 
processes as an affirmation of cultural identity—especially in the 
aftermath of 9/11—rather than as a statement of religious piety.33  What 
could the courts do to innovate here?  Some judicial education in 
Islamic family law would be an excellent beginning and could have a 
 
29. See id. at 13. 
30. In the case of the nikah, the equivalent of a prenuptial agreement, or in the case of 
Muslim divorce, an agreement to divorce using Islamic principles, perhaps negotiated with 
the help of an imam.  See id. at 11 (describing the importance of the nikah in Muslim 
marriage). 
31. See JOHN L. ESPOSITO WITH NATANA J. DELONG-BAS, WOMEN IN MUSLIM 
FAMILY LAW 20–21 (2d ed. 2001) (defining iddat as a three-month period after divorce, 
during which time an Islamic “woman is prohibited from remarrying” if the marriage has 
been consummated); MACFARLANE, supra note 23, at 36. 
32. See EPOSITO WITH DELONG-BAS, supra note 31, at 20–21. 
33. See MACFARLANE, supra note 23, at 7. 
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direct impact on judicial awards.  For example, should an award for 
spousal support be offset by any already-paid mahr?  Perhaps the court 
could appoint a mediator who is familiar with the practices of Islamic 
marriage and divorce, who could work with the couple to come to an 
agreement that respects their traditions and feels fair to both.  Perhaps 
the court could sponsor training for imams and others in the Muslim 
community who are potential bridge builders between these traditions 
and the work of the courts34 (which North American Muslims choose to 
use extensively to resolve their disputes35). 
Ignoring the existence of these traditions and their impact on the 
expectations of Muslim men and women coming to family court to 
resolve divorce conflicts is not an option if the courthouse is to continue 
to meet the needs of a diverse range of individuals in multi-cultural 
North America. 
B.  Self-Represented Litigants 
The number of self-represented litigants (SRLs) in North American 
courts has increased exponentially over the last ten years.  In family 
courts, where SRLs have historically been most common, the numbers 
are staggering.  In 1992, 46% of divorce cases in one California court 
involved at least one side who was self-represented.36  By 2000, that 
percentage had risen to 77%.37  “In Ontario, unrepresented litigants in 
the province’s unified family courts rose almost 500 percent” from 1995 
to 1999.38  The numbers are rising too in civil courts, with some districts 
reporting well over half of litigants representing themselves.39 
 
34. See id. at 42. 
35. See generally MACFARLANE, ISLAMIC DIVORCE, supra note 27. 
36. See Bonnie Rose Hough, Description of California Courts’ Programs for Self-
Represented Litigants, 11 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 305, 306 (2004). 
37. See id.  The 2004 California Task Force on SRLs reported a continuing rise.  See 
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., TASK FORCE ON SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS, REPORT OF 
THE TASK FORCE ON SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 9 (2004). 
38. Lynne Cohen, Unrepresentative Justice, CANADIAN LAW., Aug. 2001, at 40, 40. 
39. Memorandum from Madelynn Herman, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Re: Self-
Representation Pro Se Statistics (Sept. 25, 2006), https://www.ncsconline.org/WC/ 
Publications/Memos/ProSeStatsMemo.htm.  In the United States, data collected by the 
National Center for State Courts reports that 85% of all New Hampshire district court civil 
cases have one pro se party, and that 58% for the same existed in Iowa district court.  See id.  
For information about Canadian efforts to increase access to justice for litigants, see 
ADVOCATES’ SOC’Y, STREAMLINING THE ONTARIO CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2006), 
available at http://www.advocates.ca/assets/files/pdf/publications/streamlining-justice.pdf. 
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Just why SRLs are appearing more and more often in the justice 
system and what the system can and should do to accommodate them 
are more complex questions than is sometimes recognized.  These are 
the questions that my new research is seeking to answer by interviewing 
SRLs in three Canadian provinces.40  There is a widespread assumption 
that litigants choose to represent themselves because they cannot afford 
legal representation (exacerbated by declines in civil and family legal 
aid41).  Some of those who might qualify for legal aid find it impossible 
to navigate the layers of bureaucracy they must traverse to be declared 
eligible for help.  However, while lack of access to legal aid is clearly an 
overriding factor, a number of SRLs declare that they are representing 
themselves either because they can do “as good a job” as a lawyer, or 
because of a past bad experience with a lawyer.42  Regardless of the 
accuracy of this assertion—and court staff and judges may disagree—
perceptions are key in research that seeks to explain a new 
phenomenon.  This belief appears to be related to declining public 
confidence in lawyers and the justice system, diminishing deference 
toward lawyers and judges, and a renewed desire for value-for-money 
service in an era of economic hardship.  How SRLs understand their 
competence and power in relation to professional advice and assistance 
has been dramatically altered by access to the World Wide Web and 
online legal information.43 
What does the SRL phenomenon mean for innovation in the courts?  
Much of the research conducted in Canada and the United States to 
date has adopted a traditional paradigm of “unmet legal needs” (that is, 
assuming that the needs of SRLs are exclusively “legal,” variously 
 
40. See the project website at http://www.representing-yourself.com/index.php?option= 
com_content&view=article&id=45&Itemid=53 (last visited May 14, 2012). 
41. For example, the Ontario Legal Aid Review reported that “in 1996/97 the Plan issued 
only 14,063 family law certificates. . . .  The contrast with previous years [wa]s striking.  In the 
fiscal year 1993/94, 65,691 family law certificates were issued in the province.  The number of 
family certificates has dropped to levels not seen since 1970.”  See ONTARIO LEGAL AID 
REVIEW, REPORT OF THE ONTARIO LEGAL AID REVIEW: A BLUEPRINT FOR PUBLICLY 
FUNDED SERVICES 169 (1997). 
42. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COURT SERVS., HALIFAX, N.S., SELF-REPRESENTED 
LITIGANTS IN NOVA SCOTIA: NEEDS ASSESSMENT STUDY 27 (2004), available 
at http://www.gov.ns.ca/just/publications/docs/SRL%20Report%20March%202004.pdf 
(reporting survey results where 21.5% of respondents indicated that they could “do as good a 
job for myself” and 16% indicated “previous bad experience with lawyers”). 
43. See MACFARLANE, supra note 13, at 62–63, 129–44. 
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defined) and has focused on providing legal information and advice.44  
The overall goal appears to be to accommodate or assimilate SRLs into 
the existing system using, for example, duty counsel45 and online 
information systems.46  Many innovative programs have already 
commenced in these areas with courts setting up web-based and 
courthouse-based stations for assisting SRLs.47  Another response is to 
simplify court forms and procedures, and steps are being taken across 
North America to make the courts more accessible and less intimidating 
to the huge number of SRLs that are coming forward with their cases.  
Both of these developments have also taken some fire, with the volume 
and density of information and forms continuing to frustrate even the 
most determined and literate SRL.48 
Innovation for SRLs may need to go much further if this growing 
and increasingly vocal population is to be better satisfied and less 
frustrated with what the courts offer them.  Part of the challenge with 
remaining open to innovation is remaining open to reframing the 
research questions we are asking.  A more creative way of thinking 
about this challenge is to ask: What would the justice system look like if 
it were adjusted to the needs of SRLs, instead of the other way around?  
To answer this question, we have to overcome our assumptions about 
what SRLs are really looking for in the justice system—just legal 
remedies—and examine the importance of a sense of fair process 
(procedural justice), an opportunity to express their grievances, 
vindication, acknowledgement, relationship repair, and practical 
problem-solving.  What ADR processes could meet some of these needs 
and how could they be customized to accommodate those without legal 
representation?  Are new responsibilities for judges a crucial part of this 
type of innovation?  In process design, how can there be fairness where 
one side has counsel and the other does not?  And what are the 
responsibilities of counsel—should they offer unbundled legal services, 
which so many SRLs say they want49 but cannot find?  Will this presage 
 
44. See INNOVATIONS FOR SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS (Bonnie Rose Hough & 
Pamela Cardullo Ortiz eds., 2011). 
45. Duty counsel refers to counsel available for free legal advice at the courthouse. 
46. Id. 
47. See the models described in INNOVATIONS FOR SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS, 
supra note 44. 
48. Interviews with SRLs on file with the author. 
49. Id. 
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another form of legal-practice hybrid? 
VI.  THE ESSENCE OF EFFECTIVE INNOVATION 
I have argued here that continuing commitment to innovation in 
court-based ADR is a necessity if court programming is to meet the 
needs of twenty-first century disputants.  It is a relatively easy argument 
to make.  The real challenge of innovation is not its justification but its 
practice.  The heart of real and effective innovation is changing or 
modifying values, requiring us to look closely and deeply at our core 
beliefs and assumptions about disputing; often, it requires tearing them 
up and rethinking them in the face of yet another unique challenge or 
conflict.  Innovation is not just marketing—promoting oneself as a 
“collaborative lawyer” or a “new lawyer” or an “accredited mediator.”  
Neither is it only tactical change—“making nice” in mediation or telling 
the client to stay quiet in a settlement conference.  Innovation requires 
an authentic commitment to trying something new and retaining an 
open mind to the result.  This does not mean that we should be rash or 
forget to use our judgment and experience—but that dispute resolution 
innovation deserves our full intellectual and affective energy if it is to be 
a “real” experiment in something new. 
We are often eager to draft rules to define and constrain innovations 
and to try to fit a new process or procedure back into one of our more 
familiar schema.  Witness the energy expended on debates over 
professional ethical regulations in relation to conflict-resolution 
innovations, such as collaborative law.50  Sometimes the energy we put 
into developing new rules seems to be a substitute for the energy needed 
for trying something new.  To be effective innovators, we need to limit 
our preoccupation with rule-based change and explore other ways to 
support and build culture change.  When we experiment with new 
processes, we should resist easy orthodoxies and stay open to the 
possibility of failure.  As we try out new process-designs, or modify 
existing procedures in small but important ways, we should carefully 
reflect on the course of our experiment—its benefits, its downsides, its 
special challenges.  If we can do this and resist the polarities and 
 
50. See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, A Proposed Model Rule for Collaborative Law, 21 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 73, 84–116 (2005); John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative 
Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of 
Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1330–31 & n.48 (2003). 
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simplistic classifications that reflect our desire for certainty, we can stay 
committed to innovation and the courts will continue to be the focus of 
our hopes for a responsive, relevant, and fair justice system. 
 
